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CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES GRANTED RIGHT TO STRIKE
WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION
County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County v. Los Angeles
County Employees Association, Local 660, 699 P.2d 835,
214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985)
In County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County v. Los Ange-
les County Employees Association, Local 660,1 the California Supreme
Court granted public employees the right to strike, disregarding prece-
dent from its own and other jurisdictions.2
Plaintiff, the Los Angeles Sanitation District, obtained a temporary
restraining order enjoining a strike by its employees.3 The employees,
members of the defendant union, violated the order and the plaintiff sued
for tort damages.4 The trial court held the strike unlawful and awarded
damages.' On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed and held:
Public employee strikes are not unlawful at common law unless the strike
creates a substantial and imminent threat to public health and safety.6
Traditionally, courts have refused to grant public employees the right
to strike against their employers,7 citing four policy arguments in support
1. 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
2. See infra notes 7-11 & 27-33 and accompanying text.
3. Plaintiff, the Los Angeles Sanitation District, provides, operates, and maintains sewage
transport and treatment facilities and landfill disposal sites throughout the county. Defendant
union, Local 660, is the certified bargaining representative of the Los Angeles Sanitation District
blue collar employees. Each year, the District and the union bargain for wage, hour, and working
condition agreements pursuant to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), CAL. Gov'T CODE
1§ 3500-3511 (Deering 1982). 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
4. District employees went on an eleven-day strike in violation of the temporary restraining
order after contract negotiations between the District and the union reached an impasse. Id.
5. The court awarded $246,904 in compensatory damages, $87,615.22 in prejudgment interest,
and S874.65 in costs. Id.
6. Id. at 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 442. See also infra note 47 (describing the court's standard for
determining which strikes pose an imminent threat to public health and safety). See generally Note,
Collective Bargaining Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act-Should Local Public Employees Have the
Right to Strike?, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 525 n.15 (1984) (citing defendant's petition for hearing).
7. The Supreme Court first recognized a federal public employee strike prohibition in United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Many state courts applied this prohibition to
state and local employees. See, eg., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83
A.2d 482 (1951): see also City of San Diego v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees,
8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 311, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260 (1970) (citing cases from 24 jurisdictions); Annot.,
37 A.L.R.3d 1147 (1971) (listing cases by state).
The federal government and many states also statutorily deny public employees the right to strike.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1982) (forbidding an individual from holding a federal position if he
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of their position. First, public employer strikes would undermine gov-
ernmental authority.' Second, government employers would not respond
to strike pressure because the legislature sets employment terms. 9 Third,
because public services are essential, employers would make excessive
concessions to avoid a strike."° Finally, interruptions in essential public
services would threaten the public welfare.11
At least nine state legislatures have enacted statutory exceptions to the
common-law rule that permit public employee strikes in certain situa-
tions.12 These statutes use various methods to determine when a strike is
permissible. Some statutes prohibit the union from striking during the
terms of a valid collective bargaining agreement.13 Most statutes require
that a certified bargaining representative represent employees. 14 Some
statutes require the parties to exhaust resolution procedures prior to
striking. 5 In addition, most state statutes prohibit strikes by employees
whose absence would endanger the public health, safety, and welfare. 6
participates in a strike); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (Consol. 1983) (prohibiting all public employ-
ees and employee organizations from striking).
8. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
12. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1976 & Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1617-1618 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18
(West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1983); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6)(c) (West Supp. 1984).
13. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1617(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179A.18, subd. l(1)(a) (West Supp. 1985).
14. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. eh. 48,§ 1617(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18 subd. 1(1)(b) (West Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726(1) (1983).
15. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(c) (1984) (requiring mediation for employees whose serv-
ices may be interrupted for a limited time); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12(b) (1976 & Supp. 1984)
(requiring mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1617(a)(4) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1985) (requiring mediation or conciliation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18 subd. l(l)(b)
(West Supp. 1985) (requiring mediation for at least 45 days); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726(2)(a) (1983)
(requiring mediation and fact-finding); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1984)
(requiring mediation); WIs. STAT. ANN. 11 1.70(4)(cm)(6)(c) (West Supp. 1984) (requiring mediation
and arbitration).
16. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b) (1984) (prohibiting police, fire, and correctional facility
employees from striking); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. 1984) (prohibiting "es-
sential" employees from striking); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1617(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
(prohibiting security employees, state peace officers, and state firefighters from striking); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179A.18 (West Supp. 1985) (prohibiting confidential, essential, and managerial em-
ployees from striking); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.736 (1983) (prohibiting police officers, firefighters, and
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The specificity of the state legislation varies. The Illinois statute, for
example, details the class of employees entitled to strike, the prerequisites
for permissible strikes, and the procedures for employer petitions for ju-
dicial relief.'7 The Montana statute, on the other hand, broadly autho-
rizes "concerted [bargaining] activities,"' 8 which the Montana Surpeme
Court has interpreted to include a right to strike.' 9
In states that have refused to recognize a public employee right to
strike, the courts have generally held that the legislature is the appropri-
ate vehicle for such a change. In Port of Seattle v. International Long-
shoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,20 the Washington Supreme Court
refused to overturn the common-law rule prohibiting public employee
strikes, although it conceded justification for such a change.2 1 The court
rejected the proposed modification, reasoning that the legislature is better
equipped to evaluate policy issues and to determine the effects of a strike
on public health and safety.22
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court sympathized with arguments
allowing public employee strikes, but upheld the common-law prohibi-
tion.23 The court reasoned that the legislature should determine when
the public interest dictated a change.24 Likewise, the Idaho Supreme
guards at correctional or mental institutions from striking); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001 &
1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1984) (prohibiting prison and mental hospital guards, court employees,
elected officials, Governor's appointees, clergy, police officers and firefighters from striking); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978) (prohibiting strikes that would endanger the public health, safety,
or welfare); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(l)(nm) (West Supp. 1984) (prohibiting firefighters and law
enforcement personnel from striking).
17. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1617-1618 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1983).
19. See State ex rel Dep't of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 352,
529 P.2d 785, 788 (1974). Although Montana public employees have a general right to strike, a state
statute prohibits public health care facility employees from striking if another strike is occurring at a
facility within a 150-mile radius. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-110 (1985). In addition, firefighters
may not strike during the negotiation or arbitration of an employment contract. Id. § 39-34-105.
20. 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
21. Id. at 322, 324 P.2d at 1103. After reviewing the public health and safety justification for
the common-law rule, the court recognized that not all municipal functions are related to public
health and safety, such as municipal parks, pools, and museums. Id.
22. Id. The court believed that by determining the effect of a strike for each municipal func-
tion, the legislature could more appropriately determine the public interest in social regulation and
control. Id.
23. Board of Educ. v. Sussex County Vocational-Technical Teachers Educ. Ass'n, 170 N.J.
Super. 426, 430, 406 A.2d 989, 991 (1979).
24. Id. at 431, 406 A.2d at 992. The court stated that the state supreme court and the legisla-
ture were responsible for the rule prohibiting public school teacher strikes. The court noted, how-
ever, that only the legislature had the right to change the rule. Id. at 430-31, 406 A.2d at 991-92.
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Court found that the legislature had made a policy decision by not ex-
pressly providing for the right to strike in its labor statute.25 Thus, the
court held that the common law would control until statutorily
abrogated.26
Until recently, California courts have adhered to the common-law
rule.27 In Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen,28 the California Supreme Court held that state
transit employees had a statutory right to strike.29 The court stated in
dictum, however, that in the absence of legislative authorization, public
employees did not have the right to strike."0
Citing this dictum, California appellate courts consistently disallowed
public employee strikes absent authorizing legislation.3 The California
Supreme Court repeatedly avoided deciding the issue,32 although the
court protected striking unions from harsh sanctions.33
25. School Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 98 Idaho 486, 489, 567 P.2d
830, 834-35 (1977). The Idaho Professional Negotiations Act does not refer to the teachers' right to
strike, but the statute expressly prohibits strikes by firefighters. See IDAHO CODE § 44-1811 (1981).
The court rejected appellant's argument that the legislature intended to permit other employee
strikes. The court stated that if the legislature had intended that result, the legislature would have
expressly provided for such strikes. 98 Idaho at 489, 567 P.2d at 833.
26. 98 Idaho at 489, 567 P.2d at 833. See IDAHO CODE § 73-116 (1981) (the common law is
the rule of decision in all cases not provided for by statutory law).
27. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949). The court held that the city had no legal duty to collectively bargain
with its employees. In addition, the city employees could not lawfully strike or picket to enforce
their demands. The court stated that such action would constitute government by contract instead
of government by law and would be inconsistent with the city charter that set the terms for city
employees. The court also cited various forms of the government sovereignty justification. Id. at 44-
46, 210 P.2d at 311-12.
28. 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960).
29. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 30755 (Deering 1970). The statute granted employees the
right to engage in "concerted activities" for the purpose of collective bargaining. Id.
30. 54 Cal. 2d at 687, 355 P.2d at 906, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
31. See, eg., Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. Apo. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969).
Striking employees were governed by the MMBA, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3510 (Deering 1982).
Because nothing in the MMBA authorized public employee strikes, the court held the strike unlaw-
ful. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 27, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 532. See also Pasadena Unified School Dist, v.
Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977); Trustees of Cal. State
College v. Local 1352, San Francisco State College Fed'n of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 134 (1970); Note, supra note 6, at 524 nn.7-8 (collecting California cases following the com-
mon-law rule).
32. See, eg., City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 120
Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975); In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
33. See Comment, Public Employee Strikes: Legalization Through the Elimination ofRemedies,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 629 (1984) (arguing that the court, in effect, legalized public employee strikes by
266
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In County Sanitation District No. 2," the California Supreme Court
reversed the trend created by its prior dictum and established a common-
law right to strike for public employees." The court examined the four
policy arguments previously relied on by courts to disallow public em-
ployee strikes.36 The court concluded that under modem socioeconomic
conditions, three of the four policy concerns no longer justified restrict-
ing public employee strikes.37
First, the court rejected the argument that strikes would undermine
governmental authority. The court found this argument,38 premised on
the notion that "the King can do no wrong," outdated and vague.3 9 Be-
cause the government now provides many services not traditionally asso-
ciated with the sovereign, this justification was inconsistent with modem
reality.'
Second, the court rejected the assertion that government employers
not providing employers with remedies against striking employees); see also San Diego Teachers
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979) (setting aside trial
court's strike injunction because the Public Employees Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine what remedies to pursue).
34. 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
35. Id. at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438. The employer argued that the MMBA, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3500-3510 (Deering 1982), should be construed as a general strike prohibition. 699 P.2d at
840, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 429. The MMBA governs municipal employee bargaining rights. Id. § 3505.
The MMBA does not expressly grant or deny the right to strike. The court concluded that the
legislature intentionally avoided provisions granting or prohibiting the right to strike. 699 P.2d at
841, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430. For a detailed analysis of the MMBA, see Grodin, Public Employee
Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brwn Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1972);
see also Note, supra note 6.
36. See text accompanying supra notes 8-I1. There are many variations of these four policy
considerations. For further discussion of the various policy arguments for and against the right to
strike, see H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNION AND THE CmEs (1971); Bernstein,
Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 459 (1971); Burton & Krider,
The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Hanslowe &
Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes By Government Employees, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1055
(1982); Wellington & Winter, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 441 (1970); Wel-
lington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107
(1969); see also 699 P.2d at 841, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430 n.18 (citing additional authorities).
37. 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
38. See Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (relying
on the authority/sovereignty rationale); Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. v. Red-
ding, 32 IlI. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (same); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers
Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957) (same).
39. 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
40. Id. The California Supreme Court first rejected the sovereignty argument in Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (the rationale is "an
anachronism without rational basis").
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would be unable to respond to strike pressure because the legislature sets
employment terms.4 The court noted that statutes granting collective
bargaining rights to government employees terminated the legislature's
exclusive role in setting public employment terms.42
Third, the court rejected the policy argument that because public serv-
ices are essential, employers would make excessive concessions to avoid a
strike.4 3 The court simply noted that many government services are
nonessential. In addition, other economic factors limit the bargaining
power of striking employees.'
In examining the fourth policy consideration, the concern for public
welfare, the court distinguished between "essential" and "nonessential"
public services. 45 The court held government employers could prohibit
strikes by employees providing "truly essential services"-principally po-
lice officers and firefighters.46 However, government employers could
not prohibit strikes by employees providing nonessential services, such as
the County Sanitation District No. 2 sanitation workers, unless the em-
ployer established that the strike created "a substantial and imminent
threat to the health or safety of the public."'47
41. 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432. This theory states that because the legislature sets
the terms of public employment, public employers are powerless to respond to strike pressures. See
City of San Diego v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87
Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949).
42. 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
43. Id. This argument is based on the belief that public demand for these services would force
employers to make abnormally large concessions to workers, resulting in higher taxes and a redistri-
bution of resources among government services. For further explanation of this theory, see H. WEL-
LINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CrIEs 167, 195-96 (1971); see also City of New
York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y. 2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 901 (1968), reh'g denied, 396 U.S.
8721 (1969).
44. 699 P.2d at 843-45, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432-34. The other factors that would control em-
ployee bargaining power include lost wages by public employees during a strike, public concern over
increased tax rates necessary to pay higher salaries, and public employer ability to subcontract with
the private sector for these services. IdL at 844-45, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34. See also Burton &
Krider, supra note 36, at 425-27.
45. 699 P.2d at 845-46, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35. The court noted that in contemporary indus-
trial society, the government has undertaken many services that are not absolutely essential. Id. at
845, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
46. Id. at 850, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 439. The court noted that this limitation would control con-
cerns of "excessive bargaining power" and "interruption of essential services." Id. at -, 699 P.2d at
846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
47. Id. at 850, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 439. The court stated that the permissibility of these strikes
would be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court concluded that statutory standards used by
other states could guide the lower courts. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (analyzing
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The California Supreme Court failed to recognize judicial limitations
when it embarked upon this policy analysis, an analysis that all other
jurisdictions have reserved for the legislature.48 Unlike the statutory
schemes in effect in other states, the court's holding does not provide for
prestrike resolution procedures49 or define "truly essential" services.50
As a result, many public employees will not know whether they can le-
gally strike until after they strike, their employer seeks injunctive relief,
and a court determines whether the employees provide "truly essential"
services.51 In addition to putting the employment security of striking
employees at risk, this lack of certainty makes a strike an ineffective bar-
gaining tool.52
Although good reason may exist for permitting public employee
strikes, the legislature is in the best position to weigh the competing in-
terests of public sector employees and their employers in determining
statutory schemes). The court, however, provided its own standard to guide the lower courts:
"strikes by public employees are not unlawful at common law unless or until it is clearly demon-
strated that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat to the health or safety of the
public." Id
The court reserved decision on whether the right to strike is constitutionally protected. Id at -,
699 P.2d at 851-54, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 440-43. A concurrence, however, argued that the right to
strike is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Only when a strike presents an immediate and
serious threat to public health and safety is the state interest compelling enough to infringe on the
employees' liberty. Id. at 865-66, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
48. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. The dissent argued that only the legislature
should depart from the general common-law prohibition, stating that the legislature's role is to en-
gage in the "delicate and complex balancing process" necessary to formulate comprehensive regula-
tory schemes. The dissent contended that the court's standard would create "disruption and chaos"
with each interruption in governmental services. Id. at 867, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
49. The court does not require any attempt at resolving a dispute before employees may strike.
Id. at 868, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
Legislation providing resolution procedures reflects a balance between the competing interests of
employers and employees, forcing the parties to attempt resolution prior to a strike. See supra note
15 and accompanying text (discussing resolution statutes).
50. The court suggested that firefighters and police officers provided "truly essential" services.
The court, however, did not state if these were the only truly essential services. The court directed
the lower courts to examine other state statutes for guidance, but these statutes differ in defining
truly essential service. Id. at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
51. Employees will not always know when a strike is unlawful or when a strike, lawful at its
inception, will become unlawful because of its threat to public health and safety. See id. at 868, 214
Cal. Rptr. at 457 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
52. Some state statutes provide no more guidance and certainty than that provided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the legislative standards must withstand public scrutiny, and
the legislature has the capacity to reevaluate its guidelines if necessary.
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when a strike is permissible. 3 Other state courts should not follow
County Sanitation District No. 2, but should defer to legislative assess-
ment of the public employee strike issue.
D.P.H.
53. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing cases that recognize the legisla-
ture's unique ability to determine conditions for permissible strikes).
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